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UNPLANNED RESISTANCE:
TURKISH IMMIGRANTS IN A POSTMODERN GERMANY
PETER O'BRIEN
Trinity University

Postmodernity would seem to bode ill for immigrant communities like the Turks
living in Germany. Prominent theories of postmodern society, when analyzed in
respect to the status of immigrants, pit several strikes against them. Taking as a
given that Germany deserves the label "postmodern society," this essay discusses
three such theories and draws out the implications of each for Turkish nationals
residing in Germany. The findings are anything but merry. If the theories prove true,
Turkish migrants from Turkey should expect little or no improvement in their lot and,
worse, deterioration. This said, I refuse to conclude the essay on a note of pure
pessimism. Although I dismiss the likely success of planned, deliberate resistance
to worsening conditions for immigrants, I point to unplanned, spontaneous
resistance which can be successful if not predictable.
Though doubtless trendy, the craze of theorizing about postmodernity over the last
two decades has produced much thought of lasting, penetrating value. Too little of
this work has found its way into the social scientific research on migration despite (or
perhaps because of) the fact that theories of postmodernity suggest mainly
unhappy futures for immigrants. Below I look at the theory of
society, 2) the risk society, and 3) the truthless society.

1) the two-thirds

The Two-Thirds Society

For over a decade students of post - modern (often called "postFordist") political
economy have discerned an historically unprecedented development in advanced
industrial nations: the formation of a permanent underclass comprising a minority of
the members of a given society. Before the advent of the Keynesian welfare state
during and after the Great Depression, capitalism functioned with an
underpri\lileged proletariat comprising the vast majority. Both Keynesian and
Marxist visions of social progress professed and predicted the ultimate elimination
of the great underclass. Similarly, eminent students of "modern" citizenship, such as
T.H. Marshall

(1965), or of nationhood, such as Reinhard Bendix (1977), anticipated

long, but nonetheless successful struggles for general equality of rights and
privileges for all citizens, all nationals.
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Three decades of steady expansion in welfare spending, whether termed a "welfare
explosion" (Piven and Cloward, 1971) by one expert or "hubristic Keynesian ism"
(Beer, 1982) by another, caused the middle class to swell into what Ralf Dahrendorf
(1988:153) calls the "majority class." This was largely made possible, of cour�e. by
liberal democratic political structures in which most decisions were made according
to majority rule. For majority rule gives the economically underprivileged majority
the political advantage to fight their inequality. But this critical political advantage
dissipates, indeeds disappears altogether, as the underprivileged come to
comprise a minority as has occurred in all major advanced industrial nations. In that
case, majority rule turns into a political disadvantage.
Dahrendorf, among others, argues that neither the economy nor the polity can be
expected to come to the aid of the underprivileged minority in postmodern societies.
Due to such factors as mechanization, outsourcing and the shifting of production to
countries where labor costs are far lower, post - Fordist economies exhibit "a certain
dissociation of economic growth and employment." (Dahrendorf, 1988:145) In other
words, growth in GNP does not insure growth in employment; indeed, more likely is
a decline in employment. To the extent that advanced industrial nations can prevent
job flight, they will have to match conditions of employment in Third-World countries.
Thus, David Harvey (1989:147-58) no1es the return of the "sweatshop" to some post
- Fordist economies in the 1980s long after they had been eliminated in earlier
decades. Whether as a result of un - or underemployment, claims Dahrendorf, post Fordist economies can be expected to spawn a sizable and permanent "underclass"
of working and/or nonworking poor comprising anywhere from a quarter to a third of
the entire population.(Dahrendorf, 1988:149)
Yet, postmodern governments are less likely than modern ones to assist the
underclass precisely because of majority rule. In Dahrendorf's (1988:153-54)
words,
It cannot be assumed as a matter of course that the majority class has
an interest in breaking the cycle of deprivation of those who have
dropped into an underclass position. On the contrary, in precarious
times, the majority may well have an interest in actively defining some
out and keeping them out to the protection of those who are in.... Marx
thought that bourgeois society was unique in that for the first time the
suppressed class - the class of the future - would comprise the
overwhelming majority of the people who would organize and topple
the ruling minority. In one sense, the opposite has happened. The
overwhelming majority of the people have found a reasonably cosy
existence.... But they are not sure the good times will last. They begin
to draw boundaries which leave some out in the cold. Like earlier
dominant classes they have all kinds of reasons for drawing such lines.
.
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Claus Otte dubs this potential majority "the great coalition... between the traditional
Left and traditional Right."
Implicit in this project is a negative reference to the peripheral groups
in the new social movements .... The logical public policy
consequences of this assumption are repression and surveillance,
exclusion and nondecisions, and, at best, a measure of symbolic
politics aimed at preventing the peripheral elements from winning
support among the old or new middle classes (Offe, 1987:96-99).
As long as this coalition comprises an easy majority, say two-thirds, and majority
rule stays in force, postmodern societies are likely to get easier for two thirds and
harder for one third.
Much evidence exists to suggest immigrants form a significant part of Germany's
underclass. Each year the Federal Commissioner for Aliens publishes a report "on
the Situation of Aliens in the Federal Republic." And in each report foreigners, taken
as a statistical aggregate, register below Germans in basic socio-economic
indicators. Thus, foreign workers make only 87% of what their German colleagues
earn. Foreigners usually suffer a rate of unemployment twice that of Germans
(Turks often thrice the German rate). Of the unemployed 41.3% of Germans but
78.8% of immigrants possess no vocational degree. Among those who do work
immigrants are overrepresented in low-paying, unskilled jobs. For example, while
foreigners make up roughly 8% of the total German population, they constitute
approximately one third of the workforce in the textile, janitorial, and hotel and
restaurant industries. Inversely, when it comes to higher-paying jobs, Germans do
much better than resident aliens (45.8% to 23.5% in skilled jobs, 53.5% to 19.1% in
management positions). Immigrants generally live in more cramped, lower-quality
flats (21.5 square meters per person among foreigners, 34.5 among Germans),
even though they pay higher rents per square meter (6.92DM compared to 6.85DM
for Germans). Foreigners' children tend to do less well at school than German
pupils. While 26.8% of foreigners and 13.6% of Germans attend the Hauptschule,
10.0% of foreigners and 24.1% of Germans enroll in Gymnasium. The latter
records, of course, suggest that the inequities between foreigners and citizens will
persist into the future (Bericht, 1994).
General socio-economic indicators reveal only one other large group in German
society which is systematically underprivileged: the east Germans. (O'Brien,
1996a:114-20) Together, immigrants (around 7 million) and east Germans (around
16 million) comprise close to 29% of the total population. In other words, united
Germany appears well on its way to becoming the stereotypical "two-thirds society"
with a permanent minority underclass.
Are there signs that the mostly west German majority class is coalescing behind
anti-immigrant policies and practices? The toughening of the land's refugee laws in
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1993 stands out. Because the reforms meant amending the constitution (Article 16)
Helmut Kohl's government needed two-thirds support in the Bundestag. Kohl had
frequently failed to muster this support due to the steadfast refusal of the Social
Democrats to sign on. That abruptly changed in 1993 when an arson attack on a
refugee hostel in Solingen killed five Turks. Social Democratic leaders felt their party
had to respond boldly to the refugee issue because it had reached crisis proportions.
They cut a deal with Kohl, the legislation designed to make it harder for refugees to
enter Germany and easier for officials to deport them received the needed two
thirds vote in the Bundestag, and went into effect on July 1, 1993. Offe's "great
coalition between the traditional Right and the traditional Left" had been formed (Of
fe, 1987). Furthermore, the stark insensitivity of the legislation {blaming and
attacking the victims rather than the perpetrators of xenophobia) would seem to
make likely future anti-immigrant legislation {perhaps similar to the Welfare Reform
Bill passed by the great coalition in the US during the 1996 election year).
The Risk Society

Ulrich Beck's vision of postmodernity is dominated by inescapeable risk.
Postmodern problems distinguish themselves from modern ones through
exponentially heightened risk (Beck, 1992). Whereas in modern society, Beck
explains, threats to human physical well being were largely tangible and correctable
(for example, hunger) as well as concentrated against a specific group (say the
poor), postmodern threats tend to be intangible, uncorrectable and dangerous to
everyone in society regardless of status (for example, ozone depletion). The latter
are experienced more as risks (what might happen) than ravages (what actt1 111\
happens). Beck e�plains his argument in the following manner:
The "logic" of risk production and distribution is developed
comparison to the "logic" of the distribution of wealth (which has so tar
determined social-theoretical thinking). At the center he the risks and
consequences of modernization, which are revealed as irreversible
threats to the life of plants, animals, and human be ings. Unlike the
factory-related or occupational hazards of the nineteenth.and the first
half of the twentieth centuries, these can no tonger be 1lmited to certain
localities or groups, but rather exhibit a tendency to globalizqtion which
spans production and reproduction as much a.s national borders, and
in this sense brings into being supra-national and norrclass-specific
global hazards with a new type of social and political
dynamism...(Beck, 1992:13).
Beck underscores the irreversibility of postmodern threats. Unlike modern
problems, postmodern ones elude rational, scientific solutions. The rational solution
to hunger, for instance, was obvious and feasible: feed people. But what is the
rational solution to postmodern problems like global warming or the Chernobyl
accident? The "new ...political dynamism" privileges irrational over rational forms of
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persuasion in postmodern politics. In the absence of rational solutions, Beck
contends, the voices of reason (of scientists and other experts) become muted. In
their place grow louder the irrational voices of doomsayers who greatly exaggerate
risks and proffer irrational solutions.
Elsewhere I have argued that immigration deserves to qualify as a postmodern risk
phenomenon (O'Brien, 1996b). The source or cause of migration to Germany has
become increasingly intangible and uncontrollable. In the Fifties and Sixties, public
officials knew exactly where to recruit migrants and carefully controlled the number
of them entering and exiting the land. But today, because resident aliens enjoy rights
of uniting their families, it is difficult effectively to regulate the number of immigrants.
For instance, Bonn offically halted recruitment of foreign workers in 1973; since
then, the number of resident aliens in the land has steadily increased.

(Bericht,

1994: 92) With each migrant permitted to immigrate there really is no longer a way to
know how many, in the long term, have indirectly been accepted.
Relatedly, Germans have little control over whence or why migrants come to the
Federal Republic. The so-called "push factors" in migration can abruptly change,
sending an unexpected wave of refugees. This occurred after the coup in Turkey in
1980 and after the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia in 1991. Such incidents as well as
the potential number of migrants they will send off are virtually impossible to predict.
Nothing better dramatized the risk involved in migration than the sudden revolutions
in East Europe in 1989 which raised the Iron Curtain. Estimates of the total of
potential emigrants from the area ran as high as 25 million. West Germany was
essentially "forced" to annex the German Democratic Republic lest its citizens
crowd into the already densely populated Federal Republic. And although Germany
appears temporarily to have stemmed the tide of east European emigration through
astronomically expensive aid packages of one sort or the other, scary "what-ifs"
continue to trouble Germans -- what if the eastern European economies collapse,
what if the region is struck by a major environmental disaster?
Germans have also experienced how difficult it is to foresee the domestic
consequences of migration. What began as an "all-win-no-lose" prospect of
recruiting young, healthy foreign men has mushroomed into a complicated social
phenomenon generating many dilemmas. The existence of millions of foreign pupils
has forced the educational system to tackle difficult financial and cultural issues
surrounding multi-cultural student bodies. Ethnic enclaves like the many Turkish
communities in Germany have produced organizations whose actions and
principles often conflict with German law. Germans themselves have in response to
migration jettisoned the predominant values of the Federal Republic's liberal
democra,cy by supporting xenophobic parties and commiting or tolerating acts of
violence against foreigners. And again, there is no certain way to predict what
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impact these developments will have on Germany in the future. In this vein, an
election analyst warns:
the number of voters who decide in favor of the extreme right-wing
parties represents only a relatively small part of the general readiness
for adopting a right-wing point of view and the protest potential which
exists for our society and which could be mobilized in favour of a right
wing party, e.g. in the case of an economic crisis or under the strong
pressure of immigration (Jaschke, 1993:127).
Today, the risks of migration threaten everyone. Gone are the days when only a
handful of police officers, plant managers and slum landlords have to deal with
migrants. Virtually everyone's children share classrooms and resources with
foreign pupils. Scarce are the Germans who do not have a foreign colleague. All of
Germany's public agencies serve and deal with resident aliens alongside German
clients. Everyone's taxes go to pay for the countless public programs which address
issues of migration. Reports of violent skirmishes between neo-Nazis and
foreigners or between factions of foreigners themselves pepper the daily
newspapers. Migration is now a collective, national problem atop the political
agenda. Not long after Unification, three quarters of polled Germans designated the
"foreigner problem" as the most important issue confronting Germany (Leggewie,
1993:165).
Effective solutions to the problems of migration evade policy makers. Amidst anti
migrant sentiment following the recession of 1973, for example, the Schmidt
administration initiated its "consolidation policy" (Konsolidierungspoliti/9 to reduce
the number of foreigners in the land. By the time Schmidt left office, the number of
foreigners had grown by 700,000 (Bericht, 1994:92). Kohl's "return policy"
(Ruckkehrpolitik) met with the same fate a decade later. By 1992, the number of
foreigners in the land had increased by nearly 2 million (Bericht, 1994:92).
Foreigners enjoy a host of rights through the Basic Law or various international
treaties which make it difficult for the state to control their entrance and exit. The
same fate befell numerous other policies designed to sequester, silence or neglect
migrants living in the Federal Republic. They foundered in the courts on the shoals
of the extensive social and civil rights guaranteed by the Basic Law (O'Brien, 1996a:
43-105). These policy failures in turn increase the (perceived) risk of migration
because as long as they continue to fail, it is impossible to know how long or to what
extent the problems of migration will confront the Federal Republic.
As already intimated, Beck (1992:29) predicts the decline if not demise of reason in
postmodern politics. Or as he puts it, "in definitions of risk the sciences' monopoly
on rationality is broken ..There is no expert on risk."Rational discourse based on
grounding arguments in independent empirical or logical fow1dations stands at a
..

disadvantage in the risk society because risks are ultimately produced by and
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dependent upon consciousness. That is, if someone feels at risk, the risk exists: and
the greater the risk is experienced, the greater it becomes. As Beck (1992:23) puts
it, "in class and stratification positions being determines consciousness, while in risk
positions consciousness determines being". In such an environment, those who
are adept at shaping consciousness have considerable political advantage over
those who merely measure being.
In the Eighties and Nineties, irrational voices keen to foment fear and hatred of
immigrants have increasingly drowned out the voices of reason. During the
Seventies, talk of "integration" dominated the discussion of immigration. Politicians
debated the desired extent and pace of integration but virtually all accepted it as the
primary goal of immigration policy. For all its faults and foibles, integration does
constitute a rational response to large-scale immigration. But in 1982, the ambitious
leader of the opposition sensed the potential political payoff of unreqson. Keen to
unseat Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Helmut Kohl made immigration reform a major
element of his relentless attacks on the administration. "The number of foreign
citizens must be reduced" he proclaimed shortly before ousting Schmidt. Kohl knew
perfectly well that it was the position of his own party as well as of its chief supporter,
the German Association of Employers. that the German economy would become
more dependent on foreign labor in the future due to lower birthrates among
Germans. More outlandish claims were made in the effort to usurp Schmidt. Soon
to-be Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann complained that Germans were
"becoming a minority in their own land."(Elsner and Lehmann, 1989: 276) Needless
to say, he offered no statistics to prove this absurd claim. A party communique
published that year contended that "the limit of burdenablity for our state and its
population, for the infrastructure as well as for the housing and job market has been
reached" ("Union," 1982:11-13). It too conveniently neglected to note that West
Germany took on over 8 million German immigrants between 1945-51 without
disaster. Nor did the paper refer its readers to the countless scientific analyses
which show immigrants to be a net gain for rather than drain on German society ($en
and Goldberg, 1994).
Upon becoming Chancellor, Kohl announced, two weeks before national elections
he called to confirm his majority support in the Bundestag, a slate of harsh
measures he would implement after the election to curb immigration. Most of the
measures, such as lowering from 16 to 6. the age at which a child could legally
immigrate to Germany to be with its parent(s), Kohl and his advisors knew were
unconstitutional. And, in fact, after the election they were tabled. But they had the
desired effect among an electorate 75% of which, according to pollsters, opposed
the permanent presence of a large immigrant community in Germany (O'Brien,
1996a:77-89). Kohl and his coalition partners were returned to parliament with a
majority of seats.
Others were quick to note the persuasiveness of unreason. The xenophobic
Republican Party burst onto the political scene in 1985, winning over 7°/o of the vote

84

in West Berlin. And as already suggested, the decision by all but one of the parties
represented in parliament to toughen Germany's asylum laws in 1993 amounted to
a sheer mockery of logic and reason. In effect, the parlia-mentarians sought to
discourage neo-Nazi violence by giving in to precisely the demands they were
making: Keep foreigners 9ut! Advocates of immigrants and their rights should take
heed and realize that rational arguments designed to protect or promote migrants
are unlikely to be successful. They tend to fall on deaf ears in the risk society.
The Truth less Society

Postmodern societies distinguish themselves from their predecessors through the
absence of accepted, guiding universal truths. For more than a century, a virtual
army of Nietzscheans, Heideggerians, Foucauldians, Derrideans and others have
been relentlessly hammering away at the foundations of Western thought -- and not
without success. Deconstructivists of one sort or the other have spread suspicion in
all transcendental claims, showing them to be biased or part of some hidden power
play. This philosophical and cultural development prompted Jean-Frangois Lyotard
(1984) in a much celebrated piece to declare the death of universal truths or what he
termed "metanarratives." Living without transcendental philosophies which guide
the way we organize ourselves and our societies had become "the postmodern
condition:" "I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives" (Lyotard,
1984:xxiv).
Drawing out the political implications of Lyotard's work, Chantal Mouffe {1993:4-5)
underscores "the impossibility of a world without antagonism" and."the illusion of
consensus and unanimity" in

postmodern politics.

Gone are the days when all

citizens (or even a majority of them) can unite behind one overarching ideology such
as "all persons are created equal" or "we all belong to one nation." Postmodernity
has sounded the death knell to all such universal truth claims and left us with
ineradicable diversity and antagonism.
Persons interested in better rights for immigrants, in other words, fool themselves
when they think they can build mass support around ethical pleas for equality for or
tolerance toward immigrants. Such calls were made in the Seventies in West
Germany and met with considerable success as federal, state and local
governments all promoted integration. Success was possible then because there
existed a modern consensus in the land that the Germans must eschew the racist
nationalism which had" made Hitler and the Holocaust possible. That consensus
fizzled in the postmodern Eighties. Early on in the decade, Christian Democrats
began complaining about the nation's low self-esteem. This they blamed on an
antequated hang-up with Hitler and the Holocaust. Franz Josef Straus, for instance,
implored his compatriots to stop viewing their past "as an endless chain of mistakes
and crimes." It was time for Germany "to emerge from the shadow of the Third Reich"
and "become a normal nation again." It was time for Germans to "walk tall "(Evans,
1989:19). Conservative scholars, such as Michael StOrmer and Ernst Nolte, sought
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to lessen the weight of guilt by arguing that the Holocaust was not uniquely evil.
Others -- Pol Pot, Stalin, the Ottomans -- had committed genocides of similar
(Historikerstreit, 1987). Chancellor Kohl seemed
magnitude and ignomy
influenced by these sentiments when he invited Ronald Reagan to Bitburg
cemetery, where Waffen-SS men were buried, and began renewing long dormant
demands for the reunification of East and West Germany.
Protecting and promoting the German nation was no longer taboo, and nationalists
began coming out of the woodwork. In 1981, for example, 15 professors of
considerable esteem published the "Heidelberg Manifesto," which warned that
integration with its goal of a "multicultural society" was causing "the mongrelization
of our language, our culture, and our tradition." The CDU argued it had an
"obligation" to reduce the number of foreigners in the land in order to make room for
emigres "from German-speaking territories" ("Union:" 1982). Citizen initiatives
named "Lists Against Foreigners" sprang up in the early Eighties in several Lander
and eventually formed into the Republican Party with its openly racist and
xenophobic platform. The nationalist euphoria surrounding Unification in 1990
reinvigorated the underground neo-Nazi movement. It increased its attacks on and
marches against foreigners. In Rostock in 1992, German citizens were seen
cheering on neo-Nazis as they burned down a dormitory for refugees and tormented
those fleeing the blaze (O'Brien, 1996a:107-10).
It would be an exaggeration to claim a tidal wave of nationalism swept the land. Neo
Nazi incidents remained isolated if more frequent. Large counterdemonstrations
against neo-Nazi violence were organized throughout Germany to protest Rostock
and other incidents like it. Prominent politicians, like President Richard von
Weizsacker, condemned nationalism (O'Brien, 1996a:110-14). No nationalist
consensus emerged, but it did become equally acceptable to favor integration as to
favor "reintegration" {Kohl's euphemism for repatriation).
Not only Germans suffered from lack of consensus. Immigrants have found it
impossible to unite even among themselves. Not only have different national and
religious identities hampered cooperation between, say, Greek and Turkish or
Christian and Muslim immigrants, immigrants sharing the same nationality or
religion have found it hard to see eye to eye on matters. Within no group is the
political diversity, indeed antagonism, greater than among the immigrants holding
Turkish passports. Religious organizations range from the Avrupa Milli GorO§
Te§kilatlan to the islam KultOr Merkezleri Birligi to the government-sponsored
Diyanet l§leri Turk islam Birligi all the way to the Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu.
Politically, the list runs from the conservative Hurriyet9i Turk-Alman Dostluk
Cemiyeti through the Sosyal Demokrat Halk Dernekleri Federasyonu and Go9men
Dernekleri Federasyonu all the way to the Partiya Kerkeren Kurdistan. Not only do
many of these organizations find it impossible to cooperate with one another, they
often find themselves in vehement, at times violent conflict with one another ($en
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and Goldberg: 1994:92-117). Such diversity is to be expected in postmodern
society. By the same token, a unified immigrant community struggling together
against worsening conditions is not to be expected.
Unplanned Resistance

Surprisingly, the Nineties have seen some of the greatest improvements in the
rights and opportunities for Turkish nationals since immigration began in the Sixties.
In 1990, a new Aliens Law went into effect and significantly liberalized the
regulations governing naturaliza tion. The new law dropped the difficult
requirements for naturalization (proficiency in German, adequate housing, steep
fees) from the 1965 Aliens Law and granted all resident aliens under 23 who had
lived in Germany at feast eight years a right to become a German citizen. Those 23
and older could naturalize after 15 years of residence. The greatest disincentive to
naturalization -- the ban on dual citizenship -- the Kohl administration lifted in 1994
for children under 18. Since then the Chancellor has talked about allowing dual
citizenship for all soon.
The government also intensified its efforts to protect resident aliens from violence.
Between 1989 and 1995; state and federal governments banned ten neo-Naz1
organizations. In 1993, the Bundestag amended the Victims Indemnity Law to
make foreign victims equal to Germans in benefits. A year later Kohl's government
successfully proposed that parliament expand the powers of the police and
intelligence service to apprehend more right-wing extremists. The same legislation
made public display of Nazi symbols a crime. Kohl had earmarked in 1992 DM 20
million per year to combat neo-Nazi violence in east Germany. The measures
proved effective. From 1993 to 1994, the number of reported hostile acts toward
foreigners halved (O'Brien, 1996a:113-114).
These significant improvements did not, however, result from a long and deliberate
lobbying campaign on the part of immigrants and their backers. The acts came
rather in response to perceived crises of the moment. Moreover, in .those crises
immigrants' deadliest foes ironically acted as their greatest allies. The Aliens Law of
1990 was hurried through the Bundestag as "emergency legislation" during the fall
of 1989 to allay increasing fears among nervous onlookers (O'Brien: 1989) that the
soon-to-be unified Germany would not repeat Hitler's mistakes. Ironically, swelling
German national pride and solidarity aided the immigrants' cause. Similarly, neo
Nazis did more to pass the other acts listed above than immigrants or their
supporters. All of that legislation came shortly after and in direct response to highly
publicized acts of terror against foreigners in Hoyerswerda in 1991, Rostock in 1992
or Solingen in 1993.
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CONCLUSION
I do not wish to dismiss this legislation. It amounts to the most significant
improvement in immigrants' rights in Germany in decades. I wish rather to dismiss
the potential illusion that the legislation reflects some broadly based national
consensus in favor of immigrants which can be tapped again and again in the future
to continue improving the rights and opportunities of immigrants. The years 1989 to
1994 were unique. No one, including the Germans, knew what a reunited Germany
would do. The risk of making mistakes at a critical juncture in history moved German
policy makers to act in bold ways. As the anxiety over the future of Germany
subsides, policy makers are likely to return to their old incremental ways.
Political activists for immigrants can learn from this experience. They can learn that
conventional lobbying and organizing are unlikely to bear much fruit in postmodern
society. They can learn to divert much of their energies and efforts to irrational
arguments designed to spread fear and anxiety. And they can learn to redefine the
meaning of "ally" from someone who believes as they do to anyone who directly or
indirectly helps their cause. This may seem like unprincipled US pragmatism, but in
postmodern politics it and only it works.
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